Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Cristobal Serrato and Elida Serrato v. Utah Transit
Authority and Lance K. Sargent : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jody K. Burnett; Williams and Hunt; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
G. Eric Nielson; Bertch and Birch; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Serrato v. Utah Transit Authority, No. 990951 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2409

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA
SERRATO,
Plaintiffs/Appellants

Case No. 990951-CA

vs.
Priority No. 15
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY
and LANCE K. SARGENT,
Defendants/Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDEROF
DISMISSAL OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

G. ERIC NIELSON
BERTCH & BIRCH
Commerce Center, Suite 100
5296 South Commerce Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
JODY K. BURNETT
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

MAR 2 h 2000
Julia D'Aleeandro

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA
SERRATO,
Plaintiffs/Appellants
vs.

Case No. 990951-CA

Priority No. 15

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY
and LANCE K. SARGENT,
Defendants/Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDEROF
DISMISSAL OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

G. ERIC NIELSON
BERTCH & BIRCH
Commerce Center, Suite 100
5296 South Commerce Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
JODY K. BURNETT
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONTROLLING STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

I. Nature of the Case

3

II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court

3

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

8

I. Notice of Claim Requirements

9

II. Utah Courts Have Validated the Filing of Notice of Claim to Persons
Other than the "Governing Body" of a Political Subdivision
10
III. The Serratos' Notice Satisfied the Purposes of the Statute

12

A. The purposes underlying the Act's notice of claim requirements.. 12
B. Sending the notice of claim to the UTA's risk manager and to
its claims administrator satisfied the objectives of the statute
IV. Additional and Unique Factors Justify the Serratos' Decision to
Serve the UTA's Risk Manager and Claims Administrator

i

13

15

A. It is not readily discernable who or what is the "governing
body" of the UTA

16

B. An employee of the UTA directed Serratos' counsel to
file the claim with the UTA Risk Manager

18

C. The UTA board of directors has delegated the handling
of claims to its risk management office

20

D. The actual UTA Board of Directors would never have seen
nor reviewed the Serratos' notice of claim even if it was
addressed to the UTA's "Board of Directors"

22

V. Utah's Savings Statute Should Apply to Allow the Serratos to
Refile Their Notice of Claim and then Their Complaint
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
ADDENDUM

ii

24
27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case Authorities:
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1989)
Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996)
Bischel v. Merritt. 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995)
Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994)
Carr v. Enoch Smith. 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah App. 1989)
Durham v. Duchesne County. 893 P.2d 581 (Utah 1995)
Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979)
Glover v. Bov Scouts of Am.. 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996)
Johnson v. City of Bountiful. 966 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998)
Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp.. 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998)

9
10, 19

8, 10-13, 18-19
10, 12-13
23
2
25-27
8
19
8, 10-11, 13, 18, 21

Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983)

25

Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)

24-26

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles.
681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984)

9

Rice v. Granite School Dist.. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969)

19

Roundy v. Stalev. 1999 UT App 229, 984 P.2d 404

23

Stahl v. Utah Transit. Auth.. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980)
State v. Richardson. 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1992)
iii

12, 14, 24
2

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl. 896 P.2d 644 (Utah App. 1995)
White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1994)

2
2, 8

Statutory Authorities:
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1001

17

Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1004

17

Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1038 & -1039

17

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11(2)

9

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13

10, 17

Utah Code Ann. §63-37-1(1)

22

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)

1

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40

24,27

Utah Code Ann. §78-14-8

26

Court Rules:
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)

8

iv

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case, this Court has
original jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996) and the trial court's Minute Entry and Order granting Appellant's Motion to
Extend Time to Appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred by determining as a matter of law that the

Serratos failed to comply with the notice of claim requirements of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act under circumstances (a) where the Act is silent with
regard to who or what is the "governing body" of the UTA and silent with regard to
how the notice should be filed with the governing body, and (b) where the purposes
underlying the notice of claim requirement were satisfied by the notice of claim
filed, (c) where a UTA employee instructed the Serratos' counsel to send the notice
of claim to the UTA Risk Manager, (d) where the UTA Board had essentially
delegated responsibility for such claims to the UTA risk management office, and (e)
where the UTA Board of Directors would not have actually received the notice of
claim in any event. (R.92-122, 316) Standard of Review: Inasmuch as summary
judgment is granted as a matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court
for correctness, while viewing the properly submitted evidence, and the facts and
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CONTROLLING STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following statutes are of central importance to this appeal and are set forth
verbatim in the addendum to this brief:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -13 (1993)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
This case involves a personal injury dispute arising out of an automobile/bus
accident that occurred December 17, 1996. The Serratos were injured in that
accident as a result of their collision with a negligently operated Utah Transit
Authority (hereinafter "UTA") bus. Settlement negotiations between the Serratos
and the UTA ensued. A notice of claim was eventually filed with the UTA's Risk
Manager and Claims Administrator, and a complaint was subsequently filed in the
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County. The trial court granted UTA's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Serratos case on the basis that the
Serratos' notice of claim was not filed with the UTA Board of Directors.
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court
On or about April 15, 1998, the Serratos filed a complaint alleging negligence
against the UTA and Lance Sargent, the UTA bus driver involved. (R. 1-4)
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The UTA and Mr. Sargent filed an answer on May 8, 1998. (R. 8-11)
Subsequently, on July 21, 1998, the UTA and Mr. Sargent filed a motion for
summary judgment, alleging that the Serratos failed to timely serve a notice of claim
on the UTA Board of Directors or upon any individual Board member of the UTA.
(R. 13-29)
On January 14, 1999, the Serratos filed their opposition to the defendants'
motion for summary judgment (R. 41-80) and filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment, citing the Utah Savings Statue, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, which the
Serratos argue would allow them one year to correctly file the notice of claim with
the UTA and to file a new Complaint. (R. 84-91)
These motions were heard by Judge Henriod on August 2, 1999. (R. 316)
Judge Henriod subsequently granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment
and denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in a final judgment and
order entered August 26, 1999. (R. 249-251)
This appeal ensued from that final judgment and order.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
This case involves a personal injury dispute arising out of an automobile/bus
accident. On December 17, 1996, at approximately 6:40 am, Cristobal Serrato was
driving his truck eastbound on 4715 South. Elida, Cristobol's wife, was riding with
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him. At the intersection of 4420 West and 4715 South, a Utah Transit Authority
("UTA") bus turned left in front of the Serrato's vehicle. (R. 179-80)
Both Cristobal and Elida were injured in this accident, and they subsequently
brought a personal injury action against the UTA and Lance K. Sargent. (R. 1-4)
On or about December 7, 1997, the Serratos, through counsel, mailed a
Notice of Claim for Injury addressed to Steven Cain, the UTA's Risk Manager, and
David Pitcher, the UTA's only Claims Administrator, and to Utah Attorney
General, Jan Graham. (R. 179-80) A true and correct copy is attached at the
addendum to this brief.
Counsel for the Serratos addressed the notice following a telephone
conversation with an individual in the UTA office who instructed Steven Paul, one
of the Serratos' attorneys, to send the notice of claim to Mr. Cain, the UTA's Risk
Manager. (R. 182-183)
Another copy of the notice of claim for injury was served by process server
upon the UTA and was received by Michele Dutcher, safety and loss administrator
at the UTA. (R. 183)
Prior to this time, the UTA's risk management office had been actively
involved in attempting to negotiate a settlement regarding the Serratos' claims. (R.
191,depo. p.27)
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The UTA Board of Directors has essentially delegated the authority to
investigate and settle all personal injury claims against the UTA to its risk
management office and to its attorneys. (R. 210, depo. p.53, R. 225-26, depo. pp.
7-8)
The Board does not engage in any substantive discussions regarding the injury
claims pending against the UTA, nor does the Board advise risk management with
respect to handling claims, nor does the Board advise whether to accept or reject
settlements offered. (R. 224-26, 231, depo. pp. 6-8, 13)
Even if the Serratos' notice of claim had been addressed to the "UTA Board
of Directors," it is extremely unlikely that any actual Board member would have
seen or read the notice inasmuch as any notice of claim is redirected to others by
those receiving the Board's mail. (R. 200-01, depo. pp. 16-19, R. 231-32, depo.
pp. 13-14)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
require that a notice of claim be timely filed with the "governing body" of a political
subdivision of the state, such as the UTA. While the UTA's governing body is its
Board of Directors, the Serratos filed their notice of claim with the UTA's Risk
Manager and its Claims Administrator.
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Nevertheless, when viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of
the Serratos, this Court must conclude that the Serratos' filing satisfied the purposes
underlying the notice of claim statute of assuring that a claim can be investigated,
evaluated and settled, and that the governmental entity be given notice of any
defective condition. The UTA's department of risk management which fulfills these
aforementioned duties did in fact receive the notice.
Moreover, when viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of
the Serratos, this Court must conclude that the Serratos were justified in sending
their notice of claim to the aforementioned individuals. It is extremely difficult to
discern from the statutes who is the UTA's governing body, let alone how to serve
that body. In addition, a UTA employee directed Serratos' counsel over the
telephone to file the notice of claim with the UTA Risk Manager, which the Serratos
proceeded to do. Inasmuch as the risk management department is essentially the
Board's agents with respect to investigating and settling injury claims against the
UTA, filing the notice of claim with key individuals in that department seems a most
reasonable choice.
Furthermore, a notice of claim addressed to the "UTA Board of Directors"
would not have been seen or read by any actual Board Member. In other words,
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requiring the Serratos to send their notice only to the Board would be to require the
performance of a futile or vain act, which the law abhors.
Under the precedence set by this Court in Bischel v. Merritt. 907 P.2d 275
(Utah App. 1995), and by the Utah Supreme Court in Larson v. Park City Mun.
Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998), this Court should validate the Serratos' filing of
their notice of claim and reverse the trial court's adverse judgment.
Finally, if the Serratos' case must be dismissed for failure to direct the notice
of claim to the UTA Board of Directors, then section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code,
the "savings statute," should apply inasmuch as the dismissal is not based upon the
underlying merits of the Serratos' injury claims and their complaint was timely filed.
Accordingly, the Serratos should be allowed to refile the notice of claim and
commence a new action against the UTA and its employee.
ARGUMENT
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Glover
v. Bov Scouts of Am.. 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996); see also Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the trial
court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371,
1374 (Utah 1994). Moreover, "[b]ecause disposition of a case on summary
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judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions
of fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence,
should be resolved in favor of the opposing party." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson
Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App. 1989); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (All "[d]oubts,
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be construed in a light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.").
In light of the facts and circumstances involved in this dispute, and in view of
prior case law addressing similar situations, the trial court erred in concluding that
the Serratos had not properly filed their notice of claim as is required as a
precondition to suit.
I. Notice of Claim Requirements.
Pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (hereinafter "the Act"), an
injured party like the Serratos had to first file a "written notice of claim" with the
appropriate governmental entity before initiating a law suit against the governmental
entity for the injury. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (1993). Furthermore, if the
injured party's claim was against a "political subdivision," such as the UTA, or
against its employee, then the notice of claim needed to be filed "with the governing

body of the political subdivision within one year" after the claim arose. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993).
Indeed, f?[s]trict compliance with the notice requirement has typically been
necessary to maintain an action" against a governmental entity. Brittain v. State,
882 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah App. 1994). "Unfortunately, the term 'governing body' is
not defined within the Act itself." Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343,
345 (Utah 1998). In addition, "[t]he statute does not prescribe a specific manner or
method for filing notice with the governing body of the political subdivision."
Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah App. 1995).
Accordingly, considerable confusion has been fostered and litigation
engendered concerning exactly who should receive a notice of claim, and how the
notice should be filed. See id.: Larson, 955 P.2d at 345. Such confusion has led
many claimants into the trap of "peppering the valley with notices of claim and
hoping one will hit close to the mark." Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d
1294, 1298 n.3 (Utah App. 1996).
II. Utah Courts Have Validated the Filing of Notice of Claim to
Persons Other than the "Governing Body" of a Political Subdivision.
Justly and equitably, the Act's general silence with regard to how, or in what
manner, a governing body of a political subdivision should be served has led Utah's
appellate courts to validate the delivery of an otherwise proper notice of claim in
10

some situations when the actual governing body was not sent the notice. See, e.g.,
Larson. 955 P.2d at 345-46; BischeL 907 P.2d at 278-79.
In BischeL this Court upheld the filing of a notice of claim under section 6330-13 with an assistant county attorney, rather than with the actual governing body,
the Salt Lake County Commission. 907 P.2d 278-79. More recently, in Larson,
the Utah Supreme Court accepted the filing of a notice of claim with the Park City
recorder, rather than with the actual governing body, the city council. 955 P.2d at
345-46. In both of these cases, the appellate court determined that the essential
purposes underlying the statutory notice requirement had been met and that other
factual circumstances involved justified the claimants sending the notices to the
persons they did instead of to the actual governing body of the political subdivision
involved. See icL; BischeL 907 P.2d at 278-79.
These same factors are involved in this case. The UTA does not dispute that
the Serratos' notice of claim met the strict form, content, and time requirements of
sections 63-30-11 and -13. It only complains that the notice was not directed to the
UTA's board of directors. Nevertheless, when viewing the facts and reasonable
inferences in the Serratos' favor, this Court must conclude that delivery of the notice
to the UTA's Risk Manager and its Claims Administrator (1) satisfied the purposes

for giving notice of a claim and (2) was justified by the unique factual underpinnings
of this case.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that the Serratos' filing of the
notice of claim was fatally defective.
III. The Serratos1 Notice Satisfied the Purposes of the Statute.
A. The purposes underlying the Actfs notice of claim requirements.
As explained by several Utah courts, "[i]t is necessary to consider the policy
of the notice requirement so that in any particular case the facts can be evaluated to
determine if the intent of the statute has been accomplished." Stahl v. Utah Transit
AutlL, 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980) (quoted in Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278; Brittain,
882P.2dat670).
It has long been accepted that
"the primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to afford the
responsible public authority an opportunity to pursue a proper and
timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to arrive at a timely
settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of public
revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation."
Bischel. 907 P.2d at 278 (quoting Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671). Moreover, Utah
courts have suggested that filing a written notice helps preserve a record that will
minimize difficulties arising from changes in administrations and also helps prevent
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the passage of time obscuring memory and distorting a claimant's recollection of
events. IdL
The Utah Supreme Court has further expounded on these purposes, declaring
that "the purpose of such notice of claim is to provide the governmental entity an
opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and
perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litigation." Larson. 955 P.2d at
345-46. As was determined in Larson and BischeL the primary purposes for
requiring the notice of claim have all been met in this case.
B. Sending the notice of claim to the UTA's risk manager and to its claims
administrator satisfied the objectives of the statute.
The court in Bischel found the purposes of providing notice had been met
because the party "entrusted with investigating and settling or defending the claim
received the requisite notice well within the one-year period imposed by the statute."
907 P.2d at 278. The very same conclusion had been previously reached by the
Brittain court when the notice was sent to the Utah Division of Risk Management.
882 P.2d at 672 (concluding that the purposes for providing notice had been satisfied
when the entity "entrusted with investigating and settling or defending the claim
received the requisite notice in a timely manner"). Finally, the Utah Supreme Court
also concluded under analogous circumstances that because an insurance adjuster for
the UTA's insurer (who was "the person entrusted with the investigation and
13

settlement procedures") had timely received the requisite information, the purpose of
the notice of claim requirement had been adequately met. Stahl, 618 P.2d at 482
(involving a former statute requiring a claim to be presented within 30 days of the
injury).
When viewing the facts and inferences in a light favorable to the Serratos in
this case, there can be little doubt that the purposes of providing the notice of claim
had been satisfied. Steven Cain, the UTA Risk Manager, and David Pitcher, the
UTA's claims administrator, both received the notice of claim directed to them. (R.
14) The facts support the conclusion that the UTA's board of directors had delegated
its responsibilities for pursuing a proper and timely investigation, for correcting any
defective condition, and for evaluating and settling any claim, to its office of risk
management, headed by Steven Cain. (R. 186, depo. p. 5, R. 210, depo. p.53, R.
225-26, depo. pp. 7-8)
In addition, David Pitcher's responsibilities as the UTA's only claims
administrator are very comparable to those of the insurance adjuster who had
received the requisite information in Stahl, which the Supreme Court considered in
that case sufficient to satisfy the notice of claim requirement.
Indeed, the manner in which the Serratos' notice of claim was addressed to
the UTA in no way inhibited the possibility of settlement and made no substantive
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difference in the way the claim was or should have been handled. The UTA has
made no real attempt to argue otherwise. In fact, the UTA had already offered a
sizeable sum of money to settle the Serratos1 claims based upon its investigation and
evaluation already in progress. Moreover, by receiving a written notice of claim,
the UTA was adequately put on notice of any defective condition that needed to be
corrected, and was further put on notice of the imminent likelihood of litigation,
thus assuring that the UTA would have the opportunity to try to settle the matter
without having to expend entrusted public funds in costly and unnecessary litigation
if it chose to do so.
IV. Additional and Unique Factors Justify the Serratos1 Decision to Serve the
UTAfs Risk Manager and Claims Administrator.
Additional and unique factors in fact justify the Serratos' decision to serve
their notice of claim upon Steven Cain and David Pitcher, similar to those factors
previously influencing this Court in Bischel and the Utah Supreme Court in Larson.
It is not easy to determine who or what is the UTA's "governing body" from the
applicable statutes. In addition, a UTA employee directed one of the Serratos1
attorneys to send the notice of claim to the UTA Risk Manager. This would seem to
be the entirely sensible thing to do inasmuch as the UTA has clearly delegated its
responsibilities for handling the claims to its risk management office and legal
department, while maintaining minimum oversight.
15

Moreover, a notice of claim properly mailed and addressed to the UTA's
"Board of Directors" would not have actually been seen or reviewed by any member
of the board of directors, but would have been redirected by those handling the
UTA's mail. Accordingly, affirming the dismissal of the Serratos' case for failure
to address the notice and envelope to the "Board of Directors" would effectively
deny the general legal and equitable principles established in the Larson and Bischel
cases, would elevate sheer literalism over substance, and, in this case of serving the
notice upon the UTA, would require the performance of an essentially futile act.
A. It is not readily discernable who or what is the "governing body" of the
UTA.
The notice of claim statutes in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act engender
considerable confusion, even for attorneys who are professionally trained to know
the law. In his deposition, David Pitcher testified that approximately one-third of
the notices of claims directed to the UTA in the two years leading up to this case
had been misdirected even though almost all had been handled by attorneys. (R.
204-05, 207, depo. pp. 31-34, 43-44)
If a claimant is able to correctly determine that the Utah Transit Authority is a
"public transit district," included within the definition of "political subdivision"
found in section 63-30-2 of the Utah Code, and that the Utah Transit Authority is
not an "authority," as is included in the definition of "state" within that same
16

section, then that individual might properly determine that section 63-30-13 applies
to filing a notice of claim with the UTA rather than section 63-30-12, as counsel for
the Serratos mistakenly determined at the time.
Even so, the confusion and ambiguity is further compounded by the fact that
the claimant is then instructed to file the notice of claim with "the governing body"
of the political subdivision. As has been previously established, the term
"governing body" is not defined in the Governmental Immunity Act.
Accordingly, the claimant would need to discover that the UTA was created
pursuant to the Utah Public Transit District Act (hereinafter the "UPTDA"),
beginning with section 17A-2-1001 of the Utah Code. Unfortunately, even if that
discovery is made, the term "governing body" is still not found in the definitions
section of that UPTDA, nor anywhere else in that Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 17A2-1004. Indeed, a claimant would need to scour the UPTDA to discover that a
public transit district has a "board of directors," which shall be "the legislative
body" of the district, with certain "powers, privileges, and duties" to perform. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 17A-2-1038 & -1039.
In other words, while no one now disputes that the UTA's Board of Directors
is in fact its "governing body," that fact is not readily discemable from the relevant
statutes. Identifying that the UTA Board of Directors should receive the notice is
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akin to a basketball player hitting a jump shot forty feet from the hoop-even the best
players will have a difficult time hitting the shot consistently.
It should be noted that even the Supreme Court seemed to sympathize with the
claimant in Larson for having to discern Park City's governing body, even though
the term "governing body" is actually defined in the Utah Municipal Code, and even
though it would seem to be more common knowledge who governs a city than who
governs the UTA. See Larson. 955 P.2d at 345-46.
Lastly, neither the Governmental Immunity Act nor the UPTDA states "how
or in what manner a notice of claim should be filed" with the UTA Board of
Directors. CL idL at 345. "In deciding how to file a notice of claim . . . to satisfy
the Act, a claimant has no other choice but to rely upon the statutes and upon the
purpose of the notice statute in deciding how, and upon whom, such a notice of
claim is to be filed." IdL at 346. As has been demonstrated, this is certainly no easy
task.
B. An employee of the UTA directed Serratos1 counsel to file the claim with the
UTA Risk Manager,
Inasmuch as " [t]he statute does not prescribe a specific manner or method for
filing notice with the governing body of the political subdivision," BischeL 907 P.2d
at 278, the claimant in Bischel "did an entirely sensible thing and called the

18

commission to ask for instructions." Bellonio. 911 P.2d at 1297 (describing what
took place in Bischel).
By the same token, Steven Paul, one of the Serratos' attorneys in this case,
did the same sensible thing and telephoned the UTA to seek instructions regarding to
whom the actual notice of claim should be delivered. (R. 182) Mr. Paul was
advised by someone at the UTA office who purported to have knowledge that Steven
Cain, the UTA's Risk Manager, was authorized to accept the notice of claim. (R.
183) Just as this Court similarly concluded in Bischel, the instruction to Mr. Paul
was certainly reasonable given the role the UTA's risk management office plays in
investigating and evaluating claims and recommending settlements. See Bischel,
907P.2dat278.
In Bischel, this Court also noted that it was "at best disingenuous for the
County to argue that Bischel's notice was inadequate merely because she directed
and delivered it as . . . instructed." IdL at 279. The same estoppel-type argument
relied upon by this Court in Bischel should apply to the Serratos' case, especially
when viewing the facts and inferences in the Serratos' favor. Cf, Johnson v. City of
Bountiful 996 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that defendant city was
estopped from raising plaintiff's failure to comply with notice of claim requirement
as defense under facts unique to case); Rice v. Granite School Dist.. 456 P.2d 159
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(Utah 1969) (concluding that an issue of material fact existed as to whether acts of
school district's agent were such that district should be estopped from asserting
statute of limitations defense). Indeed, a governmental entity like the UTA should
not be able to benefit from one of its own employees providing misinformation to a
member of the public.
C. The UTA board of directors has delegated the handling of claims to its risk
management office.
Another factor justifying filing the notice with the UTA's Risk Manager and
Claims Administrator is the practical reality that the UTA's board of directors has
delegated the task of investigating, evaluating, and negotiating personal injury
claims to the UTA's office of risk management, in which key roles are played by the
Risk Manager, who heads the office, and the Claims Administrator, who is involved
in the processing of such claims. These are, of course, the same individuals who
actually received the Serratos' notice of claim.
The Board of Directors has directly authorized the risk management
department to fulfill these duties. (R. 210, depo. p.53, R. 225-26, depo. pp. 7-8)
Moreover, in the two years preceding this case, the Board has never been directly
involved in evaluating or settling a personal injury claim, nor has the Board ever
disagreed with the risk management department's recommendations or handling of
any claim. (R. 186-87, 191, depo. pp. 8-10, 26-27; R. 200, depo. pp. 13-14)
20

In light of the fact that the UTA's Office of Risk Management is essentially
the Board's agent with respect to the investigation, evaluation, and settlement of
claims, the Serratos were entirely justified in delivering notice to the key individuals
within that office. A significant relationship exists between the UTA's Board of
Directors and its Office of Risk Management with respect to injury claims against
the UTA.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that a "city recorder has such a
significant relationship with the city council [the governing body of that political
subdivision] that one would be justified in filing notice of claim with the recorder."
Larson. 955 P.2d at 346 (emphasis added). The city recorder in Larson was not the
city's governing body. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the municipal statutes
required duties of the recorder that in essence created such a relationship with the
actual governing body that filing a notice of claim with the recorder effectively
constituted filing with the city council. Id.
Although not based upon any statute, the UTA Board and its office of risk
management do have a "significant relationship" with regard to the processing of
injury claims against the UTA. When viewing the facts and inferences in favor of
the Serratos, this Court should conclude that the risk management office is for all
effects and purposes the agent of the Board with respect to such claims. Just as the
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Larson court justified a misdirected filing upon the significant relationship between
the recipient and the governing body, so too should this Court justify the Serratos'
filing with the UTA Risk Manager and Claims Administrator. Indeed, the
justification in this case would seem even stronger than in Larson because
relationship established within the UTA is actually related to the handling of claims.
D. The actual UTA Board of Directors would never have seen nor reviewed the
Serratos1 notice of claim even if it was addressed to the UTA's "Board of
Directors".
A final factor that should weigh in the Serratos' favor is the fact that, even if
their notice of claim had been specifically addressed to the "UTA Board of
Directors," it is extremely unlikely that any actual board member would have even
seen, let alone have read, the Serratosf notice. Mailing the notice is all that is
required to file a notice of claim with the UTA. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1(1)
(1993). Nevertheless, a notice of claim directed to the Board of Directors would
have been intercepted by those that handle the mail and delivered to the UTA's
general counsel, who along with the risk management office would handle the claim.
(R. 200-01, depo. pp. 16-19, R. 231-32, depo. pp. 13-14)
Only a brief synopsis of a claim is ever presented to the Board. According to
the Board President, James Clark, virtually no substantive discussion of an injury
claim occurs during any Board meeting. (R. 224-25, 232, depo. pp. 6-7, 14)
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Moreover, the synopsis contains little more than the claim date, claimant name, type
of claim, and requested settlement amount. (R. 225, depo. p.7 & R. 77) Of course
the Board has no real need to read a notice of claim inasmuch as the tasks of
investigating and settling such claims have been delegated by the Board to the risk
management office.
In other words, the UTA Board of Directors does not actually receive a
notice of claim addressed to the Board. Utah courts have long recognized the
principle that "the law does not require litigants to do a futile or vain act." Roundv
v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229, f 6, 984 P.2d 404 (quoting Beltranv. Allan. 926 P.2d
892, 901 (Utah App. 1996)). Filing a notice of claim with the "UTA Board of
Directors" would be a futile gesture, "an idle ceremony and of no avail." Carr v.

'

Enoch Smith Co.. 781 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Utah App. 1989) (citing the rule against
futile acts with regard to tendering funds that will unquestionably be refused).

,

Inasmuch as the Governmental Immunity Act does not prescribe how a
claimant should file a notice with the governing body of a political subdivision, it
i

was reasonable of the Serratos to send the notice to the persons they did. Had they
sent the notice to the UTA board of directors, the notice would have been redirected
I

anyway. Concluding that only a notice addressed to the UTA board of directors is

\
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valid under the Act would be to elevate "sheer literalism" over substance, as the
Stahl court warned against. See Stahl, 618 P.2d at 483.
Each of the previously described factors, whether considered separately or in
concert with one another, certainly justifies the determination to deliver the Serratos'
notice of claim to Steven Cain and David Pitcher. The underlying purposes of the
notice of claim requirement have still been validated. Accordingly, this Court
should conclude that the Serratos' notice of claim filing was valid for the same
reasons that the Larson and Bischel courts so concluded under the circumstances of
those cases.
V. Utah's Savings Statute Should Apply to Allow the Serratos to Refile Their
Notice of Claim and then Their Complaint.
Section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code, often referred to as the "savings" statute,
allows a plaintiff under certain circumstances to refile a complaint within one year
of the plaintiff's action failing "otherwise than upon the merits" even though the
statute of limitations may have run and the new action would be time barred. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). One purpose of section 78-12-40 "is to assure
that claimants are not deprived of potentially valid suits by appeals that are not
resolved until after the applicable periods of limitation run." Madsen v. Borthick.
769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1988). In accordance with that purpose, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that "if dismissal of a first action is appealed, section 78-12-40's
24

extension of time for filing a second action runs from the date of the dismissal's
affirmance." IcL
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court or by the
service of a summons. Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Utah 1979).
Accordingly, the Serratos' action was "commenced within due time" as is required
under section 78-12-40 by the filing of their complaint within the statutory period.
Moreover, the summary judgment granted against the Serratos was based
upon the allegedly improper filing of the notice of claim. Nevertheless, the defect in
filing the notice, if any, did not result in a judgment upon the merits. Instead, the
judgment was based upon the failure of a precondition to suit. Accordingly, the
savings statute should apply to give the Serratos an additional one year in which to
refile the notice of claim and refile the complaint.
This important principle was confirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in

^

Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) (hereinafter "Madsen II"). In the
earlier proceedings, Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) (hereinafter
i

"Madsen I"), depositors in a finance company that became insolvent brought an
action against the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions
and the State, seeking reimbursement for lost deposits. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim on the basis that the plaintiffs had completely
l
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failed to file a notice of claim with the governmental entity within the requisite oneyear period. IcL at 630.
In Madsen IL the plaintiffs relied on Utah's savings statute to refile their
complaint after the statute of limitations had run. The trial court again dismissed the
complaint, but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that failure to file the
required notice of claim to the governmental entity amounted simply to a failure to
satisfy a "precondition to suit." 769 P.2d at 250 (relying on Foil v. Ballinger. 601
P.2d 144 (Utah 1979)). Thus, the savings statute allowed the plaintiffs to file a new
complaint.
Foil v. Ballinger involved the failure of the plaintiff to give a similar notice
required under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 7814-8. In Foil, the plaintiff's first action was commenced just prior to the period of
limitations expiring, but the case was dismissed for failure to serve the notice of
claim on the defendant doctor. Although the statute of limitations had run by the
time the first case was dismissed, the plaintiff served the statutory notice upon the
doctor and filed a new complaint.
The trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff, but the Utah
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the savings statute applied inasmuch as the
first filed complaint
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had the effect of "commencing the action." The subsequent dismissal
of the [first action] was not a decision on the merits. Section 78-14-8
merely prescribes a condition precedent to filing of a summons or
complaint. A failure to comply with such conditions does not
constitute an adjudication on the merits, but is merely a procedural
defect that does not relate to the merits of the basic action in any way.
Foil, 601 P.2d at 150. In other words, the plaintiff was allowed to serve a notice on
the doctor and commence a new action even though no notice had been served prior
to the limitations period expiring.
Similarly, the Serratos timely filed their complaint, and any procedural defect
relating to the Serratos' notice of claim certainly does not relate to the merits of their
underlying claims. Accordingly, even if the Serratos1 filing of notice of claim in
this case is somehow fatally defective, then section 78-12-40 should apply, and the
Serratos should be able to file a notice of claim with the proper party and
recommence their lawsuit. Foil and Madsen II would seem to compel such a
conclusion.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
On the basis of the foregoing arguments and analysis, the Serratos
respectfully request that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of the UTA and Mr. Sargent and denying the Serratos'
motion for summary judgment. In addition, the Serratos further request that the
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summary judgment and order be vacated and that the case be remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
DATED this ^ j > day of March, 2000.
BERTCH & BIRCH

G. ERIC NIELSDN
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JODY K BURNETT (A0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendants
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

FILED 0IST
Third Juc

r r COURT
ri District

SA^'LftKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO
STATE OF UTAH
CRISTOBAL SEBJRATO and ELIDA
SERRATO,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and
LANCE K. SARGENT,

Civil No. 980903929PI
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.
This matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Stephen L.
Henriod presiding, for a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment made on behalf
of plaintiffs and defendants on August 2, 1999. Plaintiffs were represented by G. Eric
Nielson and defendants were represented by Jody K Burnett. Following the conclusion of
the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.
The Court having reviewed the legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits submitted
by the parties, and being fully advised, issued its Minute Entry of August 5, 1999, in
which it concluded that defendants Utah Transit Authority and Lance K. Sargent are
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to that decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

- ^ viCl

1.

Defendants Utah Transit Authority's and Lance K. Sargent's Motion for

Summary Judgment on plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby granted for the reasons set forth in
defendants' memoranda, affidavits and exhibits in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment.
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied.

3.

Plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon die

<jp»*-

merits, no cause of action.
DATED this ' %

day of August, 1999.
BY THE COURT:
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Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendants herein; that she served the attached proposed
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Counsel for Plaintiffs
G. Eric Nielson
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and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 11th day of
August, 1999.
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^BIRCH
j South Commerce Drive, Suite #100
t Lake City, Utah 84107
ephone: (801) 262-5300
simile: (801) 262-2111

December 2, 1997
NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR INJURY

Steven Cain, Risk Manager
Utah Transit Authority
3600 South 700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

BY PERSONAL SERVICE

Jan Graham
Attorney General of the State of Utah
23 6 South Capital Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

BY PERSONAL SERVICE

David C. Pitcher, AIC
Utah Transit Authority
3600 South 700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

BY PERSONAL SERVICE

RE:

My Clients:
Date of Injury:

Cristobal and Elida Serrato
12/17/96

Dear Ms. Graham and Messrs. Cain and Pitcher:
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§63-30-11, et sea., (1995), as
amended, you are hereby put on notice that my clients, Cristobal
and Elida Serrato, have a claim for injury against the Utah Transit
Authority and Lance K. Sargent, the driver of one of it's buses,
for personal injuries arising out of an automobile/bus collision on
or about December 17, 1996. This claim arises from the following
facts.
A BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS; THE NATURE
OF THE CLAIM ASSERTED; AND, THE DAMAGES
INCURRED BY THE CLAIMANTS SO FAR
AS THEY ARE KNOWN
On December 17, 1996, at approximately 6:40 am, Cristobal Serrato
was driving his truck eastbound on 4715 South, on his way to work.
Elida, Cristobal's wife, was riding with him. At the intersection
of 4420 West and 4715 South, a UTA bus turned left in front of my
client's vehicle.
The driver of the UTA bus, Mr. Sargent, was negligent jfor^jf ailing
to keep a proper lookout, failure to yield the ri

Brigham City
(801)723-7300

Ogdcn
(801)394-5300

Heber
(801)654-4300

Vernal
(801)789-5300

Provo
(801)371-9200

Price
(801)637-9600

Richfield
(801)896-5858

*krdP

m 865-5300

klbW

(801)634-8300

NOTICE OF CLAIM
Cristobal and Elida Serrato
December 2, 1997
Page 2

dangerous left hand turn and failure to obey a traffic control
device. As a result of the negligence of the driver of the bus, my
clients have suffered serious personal injuries.
As a result of the collision, Cristobal Serrato has sustained
injuries to his neck, back and shoulders. Mr. Serrato has incurred
medical expenses, lost wages and will likely incur future medical
expenses related to the injuries suffered in this incident.
My client Elida Serrato has sustained injuries to her face, head,
and back, including multiple lacerations about her neck and face
and broken teeth. Mrs. Serrato has incurred medical expenses, lost
wages and will likely incur future medical expenses related to the
injures suffered in this incident.
Furthermore, Mrs. Serrato
appears to have symptoms consistent with a closed-head injury.
As a result of the negligence of the bus driver, my clients have
suffered mental and physical pain and suffering, inconvenience and
interference with the normal activities of daily living apart from
gainful employment.
Neither Cristobal nor Elida Serrato are under the age of majority
or mentally incompetent.
Sincerely,
BERTCH & BIRCH

Steven R. Paul
Attorney for Claimants
SRP/sp
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Subsection (1) and inserted "Eminent Domain"
and made a related punctuation change in Subsection (2).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166.

63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for recovery
of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802.
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11:
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be
filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2404; and
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply.
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought contemporaneously with the
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action.
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.6, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 259, 5 50; 1992, ch. 280, § 56.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, added the reference to § 63-2-405 in Subsection (1).

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 280,
§ 63 makes L. 1991, ch. 259 effective July 1,
1992.

63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service
— Legal disability,
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
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(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of
claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court
may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch.
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4;
1991, ch. 76, § 6.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added the sub-

section designations in Subsection (3)(b) and
made related changes and deleted "or imprisoned" after "legal guardian" and made related
changes in Subsection (4)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
is to require every claimant to state clearly all
of the elements of his claims to the board of
commissioners or city council for allowance as
a condition precedent to his right to sue the
city and recover his damages in an ordinaryaction. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306,
134 P. 1167 (1913).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Assignment of municipal debt.
Clear statement of claims required.
Conditions for right to recover.
Damages not specified.
Failure to file claim.
Notice.
Sufficiency of notice.
—Nature of claim asserted.
Waiver of objections by city.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Functions of the notice of claim requirement
in giving the affected governmental entity an
opportunity to promptly investigate and remedy defects immediately, in avoiding unnecessary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties
which might attend changes in administration
provide sufficient justification for its imposition as to governmental but not other tort-feasors, and therefore this section does not deny
equal protection. Sears v. Southworth, 563
P.2d 192 (Utah 1977).
Assignment of m u n i c i p a l debt.
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim required to be submitted to city in accordance
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former
law).
Clear statement of claims r e q u i r e d .
The purpose of notice-of-claim requirement

Conditions for right to recover.
Statutory right to recover is available only
upon compliance with the conditions upon
which right is conferred. One who seeks to enforce the right must by allegation and proof
bring himself within the conditions prescribed
thereby. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah
362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940).
D a m a g e s n o t specified.
A claim that stated the time, place and general nature of the injury and the sidewalk defect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former
section even though the amount of damages
was not stated; since the claim had to be filed
within thirty days of the injury, the exact
amount of damages was impossible to ascertain. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d
362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966) (decided under former
law).
Failure to file claim.
Because no claim was filed as required by
this section, action to recover moneys expended
to construct bridge which city had agreed to
construct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d
405 (1934).
Exceptional circumstances were not present
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
quirement in this section. Edwards v. Hare,
682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988).
Notice.
Service of notice is a precondition to suit.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
(But see note under catchline "Federal claim"
above.)
This section requires that two notices of
claim should have been filed by plaintiff: one to
the attorney general and one to the agency
concerned. Although this statutory requirement may result in redundant notice, the redundancy apparently is mandated by the statute inasmuch as the Utah attorney general is
the agent and legal counsel for all state agencies, including the University of Utah.
Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F. Supp.
1445 (D. Utah 1990).
The notice of claim provision would probably
be interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court as
applicable to all claims against state employees, whether or not any judgment might
ultimately be payable by the state, as long as
the employees' alleged acts were taken in the

63-30-13

course of their employment. Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Utah
1990).
Quiet title actions.
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies with
this section if it is given not more than one
year after plaintiff's right to possession has
been disturbed or encroached upon by the
state. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977).
Remedy for wrongful act.
The 1978 amendment to § '63-30-4 did not
leave the parents without a remedy for their
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity
for simple negligence to doctors employed by
the state, since parents had a remedy against
the state for injuries arising out of the negligent acts of state employees, but the parents
failed to give notice of their claim to the state
within one year as required by this section.
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186
(Utah 1987).
Cited in Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218
(Utah 1989); O'Neal v. Division of Family
Servs., 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts,
1989 Utah L. Rev. 334.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies §§ 124, 126.

C.J.S. — 81A C.J.S. States §§ 269, 271, 272,
310.
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations listed under § 63-30-11.
Key Numbers. — States «=» 174, 177, 197.

63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch.
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6.
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section, § 63-30-5.

Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq.
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78-12-39

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of
Actions § 196.
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 120.

Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions <&=>
82.

78-12-39. Effect of war.
When a person is an alien subject or a citizen of a country at war with the
United States, the time of the continuance of the war is not a part of the period
limited for the commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-39.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Wrongful death.
Statute of limitations against action for
wrongful death of alien enemy by personal
representative of deceased was tolled by this

section where only surviving heir of deceased
was mother, likewise alien enemy. Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P.
187 (1923).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of
Actions § 175.

Key Numbers.
113.

Limitation of Actions @=»

78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on merits.
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new
action within one year after the reversal or failure.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-40.

Cross-References. — Survival of cause of
action, §§ 78-11-12, 78-11-13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amendment of pleadings.
— Nonsuit.
Application of section.
— Timeliness.
— Writs to enforce judgments.
Cause of action.
Commencement of one-year extension.
— Affirmance of lower-court decision.
— Dismissal.
Conflict of laws.
— Action dismissed in other state.
Contestability of insurance policy.

Counterclaims.
Joint tort-feasors.
— Dismissal.
"Merits" of action.
—• Dismissal.
— Nonsuit.
Nonpayment of costs.
— Presumption that second suit vexatious.
Operation and effect of section.
— Advantages.
— Purpose.
Pleading and proof of tolling.
— Judicial notice.

